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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2724 
___________ 
 
DAVID ROBINSON, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES; 
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS, INC.; 
TEMPLE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES; 
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS; 
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-04667) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 29, 2012 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 12, 2012) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 David Robinson, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the 
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We will 
summarily affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the District Court. 
I. 
 Robinson brought a pro se civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against several 
defendants connected to Temple University Hospital and Health Services.  Before he was 
incarcerated in August 2004, Robinson was treated at Temple University Hospital for 
injuries he sustained after falling from the roof of a three-story building.  His injuries 
included a fractured hip and ankle.  While incarcerated at FCI-Fairton in New Jersey, 
Robinson was taken to the medical facility of United States Penitentiary-Canaan, where 
he discovered that he had OS Trigonum Syndrome in his ankle.  It is unclear whether that 
syndrome resulted from his prior treatment at Temple University Hospital.  While still 
incarcerated at FCI-Fairton, Robinson commenced this action.  He alleged that he was 
denied proper medical care at Temple University Hospital, and believes that because his 
injury was misdiagnosed he will continue to suffer long-term pain and inflammation in 
his ankle.   
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to file the certificate of merit required to substantiate 
medical claims under Pennsylvania law.  See Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3.  The District Court 
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denied the motion, but instead dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); see also Club 
Comanche, Inc. v. Virgin Islands, 278 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Court held that 
even though the action was brought on § 1983 forms, the complaint actually attempted to 
state a claim for medical malpractice under state law.  Robinson was given the 
opportunity to amend his complaint.  He filed a “motion to make additional 
findings/motion to alter or amend judgment” and a supplement thereto.  In those papers, 
he emphasized that he was presently in the custody of the United States Bureau of 
Prisons, and he argued that diversity of citizenship was satisfied because some of the 
employees of Temple University Health Services maintained citizenship outside of 
Pennsylvania.  The Court found that diversity was not established and dismissed the 
action.  Robinson timely filed a notice of appeal.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 
220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  “In reviewing a district court‟s conclusion regarding 
where a party is domiciled, our review is for clear error as to the court‟s factual 
determination but de novo as to the applicable legal principles and the court‟s conclusions 
of law.”  Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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III. 
The District Court correctly concluded that Robinson had not presented it with a 
viable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.  Robinson does not appear to contend otherwise.  See 
Argument in Support of Appeal, passim.  We, of course, agree.  To state a claim under 
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that establish (1) the deprivation of a constitutional or 
statutory right; and (2) that the defendant acted under color of state law.  West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted).  The District Court did not reach the issue of whether the Defendants acted 
under the color of state law, noting instead that Robinson‟s complaint alleged mere 
negligence—a state of mind insufficient to support relief.  This was not error.  See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (explaining that a physician‟s negligent diagnosis or 
treatment does not state a valid claim for medical malpractice under the Eighth 
Amendment); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
We therefore turn to the fundamental question presented by this appeal: did the 
District Court correctly dismiss Robinson‟s complaint for lack of diversity jurisdiction.  
A federal court has jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), over a case in which there 
is complete diversity of citizenship; “that is, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state 
as any of the defendants,” at the time the complaint was filed.  Grand Union 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).  Citizenship is determined by the party‟s domicile, which is 
the place the party is permanently residing or intends to make his home.  See McCann v. 
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Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[O]nce acquired[, a 
domicile] is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed.”  Id.  “A 
corporation is deemed a citizen „of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the 
State where it has its principal place of business.‟”  Grand Union Supermarkets, 316 F.3d 
at 410 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)).  The party invoking diversity jurisdiction bears the 
burden of proving facts by which it may be sustained.  See McCann, 458 F.3d at 286.   
 Robinson submitted records to the District Court indicating that he was a resident 
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, prior to his incarceration.  Nor does Robinson now contest 
this.  See Argument in Support of Appeal, passim.  The traditional view is that a prisoner 
remains a citizen of the state of which he was a citizen before his imprisonment, see, e.g., 
Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Crop., 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 774 (9th Cir. 1962).  If that view still governs, 
diversity jurisdiction did not exist here, as both parties are citizens of Pennsylvania.  
Some courts now follow a rebuttable presumption model; those courts presume that a 
prisoner does not change his domicile by being incarcerated in a new state, but they 
permit him to rebut that presumption.  See Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1126 (6th 
Cir. 1973); Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006); Sullivan v. 
Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249, 251 (8th 
Cir. 1977).  However, to overcome the presumption, the prisoner must introduce more 
than “unsubstantiated declarations.”  Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1126; see also Jones, 552 F.2d at 
251.   
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The courts that follow the rebuttable presumption model appear to allow a prisoner 
to establish his new domicile only in the state of incarceration, not in some entirely new 
state.  See Jones, 552 F.2d at 251 (indicating a narrow basis for refuting the presumption 
by showing a “bona fide intention to change [one‟s] domicile to the place of [one‟s] 
incarceration”).  This is consistent with the general principles of domicile, where the 
focus is on an individual‟s physical presence in a state and his intent to remain there.  See 
Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972).     
Here, Robinson contends that he does not intend to return to Pennsylvania, but he 
also does not intend to stay in New Jersey where he is incarcerated.  Instead, he claims 
that, upon his release in 2015, he plans to reside with relatives in Dover, Delaware, until 
he is able to establish his own residence in the State.  See Argument in Support of Appeal 
at 2.  We doubt that Robinson can establish a domicile in this third state.  See Krasnov, 
465 F.2d at 1300.  But in any event, his declarations are simply too unsubstantiated to be 
sufficient.  See Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1126.  Certainly, given this record, we cannot conclude 
that the District Court committed error in concluding that Pennsylvania remained 
Robinson‟s domicile.   
 Robinson, we note, alleges that Temple University Hospital is not a Pennsylvania 
citizen because (1) its billing company, Alliance One, maintains a home office in 
Michigan, and (2) some of the physicians have out-of-state residences.  Even if true, 
these conditions would not create diversity jurisdiction.  See Grand Union Supermarkets, 
Inc., 316 F.3d at 410 (requiring complete diversity).  The District Court determined that 
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Temple University Hospital is a citizen of Pennsylvania for the purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.  Again, we see no error in the District Court‟s legal or factual conclusions.  
See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Group Health, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (explaining Temple‟s citizenship status). 
IV. 
Even generously construed, Robinson‟s pro se complaint and subsequent 
submissions fail to raise a substantial question as to his domicile.  Accordingly, because 
the District Court did not err in finding a lack of diversity jurisdiction, see Jones, 552 
F.2d at 251, we will summarily affirm its dismissal of Robinson‟s complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
